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The Massachusetts Health Plan: Public Insurance
for the Poor, Private Insurance for the Wealthy,
Self-Insurance for the Rest?
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost*
The Massachusetts Law for "Providing Access to Affordable,
Quality, Accountable Health Care" represents one of the most ambitious
attempts yet by one of the United States to reform its health care
financing system.' It is useful, however, to situate this reform in the
context of a larger discussion of health care financing reform that has
been underway for some time.
For at least the past quarter century, three visions of how to reform
health care finance in the United States have competed for the allegiance
of policy makers. The first of these visions calls for expansion of public2
insurance to achieve universal coverage, or something very close to it.
This model is often characterized as a single-payer model, although
universal public coverage does not, of course, require a single payer.
Many of the world's social insurance programs in fact have multiple
payers. 3 One way to achieve universal coverage through public
insurance would be to expand the Medicare program to cover the entire
Universal coverage, however, could also be achieved
population.
Robert L. Willett Family Professor, Washington and Lee University School of Law. This
article is based in part on the author's book. TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A
CRITIQUE OF THE CONSUMER-DRIVEN MOVEMENT (forthcoming 2007).

1. H.B. 4479, 2006 Leg., 2d Ann. Sess. (Mass. 2006 (enacted)).
2. Physicians for a National Health Program Home Page, http://www.pnhp.org.
3. See DAVID CHINITZ et al., Governance and (Self-) Regulation in Social Health Insurance
Systems, in SOCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEMS IN WESTERN EUROPE 155, 155 (Richard B.

Saltman, Reinhard Busse & Josep Figueras eds., 2004) (pointing out that some social insurance
systems use multiple social insurance funds); ELIAS MOSSIALOS & ANNA DIXON, Funding Health
Care: An Introduction, in FUNDING HEALTH CARE: OPTIONS FOR EUROPE 1, 17 (Elias Mossialos et
al. eds., 2002) (same); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Why Can't We Do What They Do? National Health
Reform Abroad, 32 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 433, 433-39 (2004) (describing various models used by

other countries for financing health care).
4. See The Writing Committee for the Physicians' Working Group for Single-Payer National
Health Insurance, Proposal of the Physicians' Working Group for Single-Payer National Health

Insurance,290 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 798, 798 (2003) (noting that a fundamental change in U.S. health
care could build upon traditional Medicare), available at http://www.pnhp.org/publications/
proposal of thephysiciansworkinggroupfor singlepayer nationalhealth insurance.php.

1091

1092

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

through expansion of Medicaid or through the creation of an entirely new
program.
Universal access can readily be achieved through this approach-this
is how the rest of the world does it. There is, moreover, overwhelming
evidence that costs can be controlled in public insurance systems through
budgets, administered prices, negotiations, or some combination of the
three.5 Although public programs have in fact continued to expand in the
United States in recent years, the political barriers that face a universal
public program seem simply insurmountable.
The other two visions of reform are market based. The first of these
is the model of managed competition. This model, based on the work of
Alain Enthoven and the Jackson Hole Group, attempts to organize the
insurance market to encourage competition among insurers to bring
down health care costs. 6 It formed the basis of the Clinton Health Care
Plan, 7
and has also provided the conceptual foundation for the
Medicare+Choice, Medicare Advantage, and Medicare Part D
prescription drug program, as well as the Federal Employees Health
Benefits Plan. 8 This model focuses on controlling health care costs
through competition among health plans. Managed competition models
are often supplemented, however, with proposals for tax credits or other
subsidies for the purchase of insurance to make health insurance more
affordable. 9
The third model, also market-based, is the consumer-driven model.
This model advocates market competition at the point of service
purchase. Consumers of health care products and services should treat
health care just like other products and services, deciding at the point of
10
purchase whether to spend money on it or on something else.

5.

See JOSEPH WHITE, COMPETING SOLUTIONS: AMERICAN HEALTH CARE PROPOSALS AND

INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 271 (The Brookings Institution 1995) ; Gerard F. Anderson, et al., It's
the Prices,Stupid: Why the United States is So Differentfrom Other Countries, HEALTH AFF., May-

June 2003, at 89, 103 ("U.S. policymakers need to reflect on what Americans are getting for their
greater health spending. They could conclude: It's the prices, stupid.").
6.

ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE SOARING

COST OF MEDICAL CARE, at xxi (Addison-Wesley Publication Company 1980); Alain C. Enthoven,
The History and Principlesof ManagedCompetition, HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 24, 24.
7. See Theda Skocpol, The Rise and Resounding Demise of the Clinton Plan, HEALTH AFF.,
Spring 1995, at 66, 69 (noting that "Clinton rejected the single-payer approach" in favor of a more
moderate approach involving purchasing agencies and tax subsidies).
8. See National Center for Policy Analysis, A Primer on Managed Competition: What is
Managed Competition?, http://www.ncpa.org/studies/sl83/sl83d.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2007)
(discussing managed competition and its prototypes).
9. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN, supra note 6, at 121-24.
10. See JOHN C. GOODMAN & GERALD
L. MUSGRAVE, PATIENT POWER: THE FREE
ENTERPRISE ALTERNATIVE TO CLINTON'S HEALTH PLAN, 18-27 (1994) ("In a normal market
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Consumers are also encouraged to shop around to find the lowest price,
highest quality health care. This is done by moving consumers to high
deductible health plans that leave them with considerable "skin in the
game."" Consumer-Driven Health Care (CDHC) advocates argue that
too much of current health care coverage is not true insurance, but rather
wasteful prepayment for health care services that should rather be paid
for out of pocket. 12 This "overinsurance" creates moral hazard, causing
health care consumers to obtain services and products that they do not
really value, and that they would forego if they had to pay for them out
of pocket.' 3 CDHC advocates contend that high deductible policies,
which force consumers to pay for most health care products and services
out of pocket, will both make consumers more cost conscious and save
administrative costs.' 4 Their claim is empirically based as well as
ideological-there is ample evidence from the RAND Health Insurance
Experiment to the present that increased cost-sharing does lead to
decreased use of health care services and 5that you can save money by
making people pay for health care directly.'
CDHC advocates generally, although not always, support tax
subsidies for health savings accounts (HSA) as a way of making high
deductible policies more palatable while still retaining costconsciousness. 16 They also call for more and better information to help
consumers evaluate health care products and services.' 7 The consumerdriven strategy is, like managed competition, primarily a cost-control
strategy, although its advocates argue 8that it will also improve quality
and make health care more affordable.'
problems are solved by individual initiative on the part of consumers and producers pursuing their

own self-interest.").
11. Press Briefing by Al Hubbard on the President's Health Care Initiatives for 2006,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/2006020I - I.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2007).
12. See JOHN C. GOODMAN & GERALD L. MUSGRAVE, PATIENT POWER: SOLVING AMERICA'S

HEALTH CARE CRISIS, 3-17, 25-26 (1992) (discussing problems with the American health care
system and the role of insurance).
13.

See MICHAEL F. CANNON & MICHAEL D. TANNER, HEALTHY COMPETITION, 46-53 (2005)

(stating that "excessive coverage encourages patients to utilize care without regard to its cost").
14. See GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, supra note 12 at 249-53 (advocating use of Medical Savings
Accounts).
15. See MICHAEL A. MORRISEY, PRICE SENSITIVITY IN HEALTH CARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR
HEALTH CARE POLICY 11-27 (2d ed. 2005) (reviewing empirical literature on the price sensitivity of
health services); JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE & THE INSURANCE EXPERIMENT, FREE FOR ALL? LESSONS
FROM THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT 8-28, 338-71 (1993) (describing the RAND
Health Insurance Experiment and its findings).
16. See, e.g., GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, supra note 12, at 231-61 (exploring the potential

benefits of high-deductible health insurance and health savings accounts).
17.

E.g., id. at 32-35.

18. See, e.g., id at 249-57 (proposing numerous advantages of health savings accounts).
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The Massachusetts plan does not align itself with any one of these
visions of health care reform. It expands public coverage. It includes
public coverage through the MassHealth program for low-income
persons who fit within the categories of the "worthy poor" traditionally
covered by Medicaid-the elderly, disabled, families with children, and
pregnant women.' 9 It specifically expands coverage of children through
MassHealth.2 ° It also offers a form of managed competition through the
newly created Connector, which at least provides a regulated and
organized insurance market. 2 1 Although the rhetoric of managed
competition is not prominent in the plan, the plan does evidence the hope
that an organized insurance market will make health insurance more
affordable and bring down health care costs. Finally, the Massachusetts
plan offers access to subsidized private coverage for persons with
incomes up to 300% of the poverty level in the Commonwealth Care
program, which
includes elements of both public coverage and managed
22
competition.
The consumer-driven, high-cost-sharing model does not at first
glance seem to be featured prominently in the Massachusetts plan.
Indeed, the Commonwealth Care plan for residents with incomes below
300% of the poverty level prohibits deductibles and limits coinsurance,23
while deductibles offered through the Connector to higher-income
persons are limited to the amount of permissible tax deductible
law-currently $2,650 for
contributions to HSAs under the federal HSA
24
single individuals and $5,250 for families.
While the consumer-driven, cost-sharing-based approach is not
showcased as an ideological foundation of the Massachusetts plan, it
may ultimately be the key to the plan's individual mandate. Although
the Massachusetts plan has been promoted as an approach to providing
nearly universal insurance, for many middle-income workers that
insurance will in fact be largely self-insurance.
The individual mandate is only enforceable under the Massachusetts
As John Holahan
statute if insurance is "affordable" for individuals.
19. John E. McDonough et al., The Third Wave of Massachusetts Health Care Access Reform,
2006 HEALTH AFF.: WEB EXCLUSIVE, w420, w421-w422 (describing the expansion of the

MassHealth program to "previously ineligible populations").
20. Id.
21.

See id. at w423-w424

(describing the Commonwealth Health Insurance

Authority).
22. See id. at w423 (describing the Commonwealth Care Health Insurance Program).
23. Id. at w423.
24. H.B. 4479, 2006 Leg., 2d Ann. Sess. § 60 (Mass. 2000) (enacted).
25. Mass. H.B. 4479 § 12.

Connector

2007]

THE MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH PLAN

1095

and Linda Blumberg point out in their recent Health Affairs article, there
are two primary strategies available to health plans to become more
affordable to those who do not fall below the Commonwealth Care plan
eligibility levels. 26 Plans can either use highly restrictive provider
networks, and thus exclude high-cost providers, or they can rely on high
cost-sharing.27 Neither strategy is popular in Massachusetts, but if
national trends are any indicator, high deductible policies will become
more common. Indeed, the Massachusetts statute explicitly allows high
deductible HMOs, which are prohibited in other states, including New
York. z8 Coverage standards approved by the Connector Board allow
deductibles of up to $2000 for an individual and $4000 for a family,
separate drug coverage deductibles of up to $250 for an individual and
$500 for a family, and out-of-pocket maximums as high as $5000 for an
individual, $10,000 for a family. 29 Affordable health insurance for those
who do not qualify for Commonwealth Care or MassHealth is likely to
be insurance with high cost-sharing.
Moreover, even some of those whose incomes fall below the
Commonwealth Care eligibility levels may face high cost-sharing.
Although high deductible plans are not permitted in the Commonwealth
Care program, that program is not generally available to persons whose
employers finance 25% of their premiums (33% for families).,a
Employers, however, are increasingly turning to high deductible policies
to insure their workers. Although estimates vary, about 2.7 million
workers nationally are currently enrolled in HSA-qualified high
deductible health plans, and many more employers are currently
considering offering high deductible plans.3' It is likely, therefore, that
many Massachusetts residents whose incomes fall below 300% of the
poverty level will find themselves covered by high deductible policies
because those are the only policies offered by their employers, even in
situations where the employer pays as little as one-quarter to one-third of

26. John Holahan & Linda Blumberg, Massachusetts Health Care Reform: A Look at the
Issues, 2006 HEALTH AFF.: WEB EXCLUSIVES, w432, w439-w440.
27. Id.
28. Timothy Jost & Mark Hall, The Role of State Regulation in Consumer-Driven Health Care,
31 AM. J.L. & MED. 395, 405-06 (2005).
29. Bd. of the Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector Authority, Minutes, March 20,
2007, available at http://www.mass.gov/?pagelD=hicmodulechunk&L=1&LO=Home&sid=Qhic&b=

terminalcontent& f=board meeting_3.20.07&csid=Qhic
30. Mass. H.B. 4479 § 45.
31. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION/HEALTH RESOURCES AND EDUCATIONAL TRUST, EMPLOYER
HEALTH BENEFITS, ANNUAL SURVEY, 5 (2006), http://www.kff.org/insurance/7527/upload/7527.pdf
[hereinafter KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION].
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the cost of the policy. 32 For many residents whose incomes exceed
300%, moreover, coverage by high deductible employment-related plans
is also very likely. Indeed, because of ERISA, those covered by selfinsured employment-related plans will be absolutely unprotected by
Massachusetts law
if their employers choose to offer only high
33
deductible plans.
It is probable that the Massachusetts Health Care Access Reform will
result in a three tier system of health care coverage-a paradigm that is
in fact likely to become more and more common throughout the United
States generally. On the bottom level, those who are poor enough to
qualify for Mass Health (and who are categorically eligible for it) will
receive comprehensive coverage. Low Medicaid payment rates are
likely to restrict their choice of provider, but if they can find providers
who participate in Medicaid, the services and products of those providers
will be covered in full. 34 Those in Mass Health will receive coverage
with no deductibles and with very limited cost-sharing ($3 per hospital
visit, $1 to $3 per prescription).35 Those slightly better off will be
eligible for 36Commonwealth care, with no deductibles and limited
copayments.

At the other extreme, in the top tier, will be those who continue to
receive conventional employment-related group insurance. Assuming
that Massachusetts is like the rest of the nation, this insurance will
continue to be provided for most insureds through preferred provider
organizations (PPOs) with broad networks and loose controls over
utilization.37 Cost sharing will probably be higher than it was a decade
ago, but will likely be manageable, and will most likely take the form of
copayments.38 Coverage will be comprehensive, indeed, given the
32. Over half of members of employment-related high deductible health plans have no choice
of health plan. PAUL FRONSTIN & SARA COLLINS, THE 2ND ANNUAL EBRUCOMMONWEALTH FUND
CONSUMERISM IN HEALTH CARE SURVEY, 2006: EARLY EXPERIENCE WITH HIGH-DEDUCTIBLE AND
CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH PLANS, 14 (2006), http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI IR 1220061 .pdf.

33. Self-insured plans are not subject to state regulation under the preemption provisions of
ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000); see BARRY R. FURROW, HEALTH LAW, 654-59 (5th ed. 2004)
(discussing the ERISA Act of 1974).
34. See Steven Zuckerman et al., Changes in Medicaid Physician Fees, 1998-2003:
Implicationsfor Physician Participation,2004 HEALTH AFF.: WEB EXCLUSIVES, w4-374, w4-374
(documenting low physician participation in Medicaid).

35. Mass. H.B. 4479 § 45.
36. Id.
37. See Robert E. Hurley et al., The Puzzling Popularityof the PPO, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr.
2004, at 56 (discussing the advent of PPOs as "the most popular health benefit option among U.S.
workers").
38.

KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, supra note 31, at 3-4.
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extensive coverage and provider mandates found in Massachusetts, it
will probably be very comprehensive.
Some of these higher-income insureds may have high deductible
policies. Much of the dramatic movement toward high deductible plans
in the past couple of years has been among high-income households.3 9
Some of these high-income households are insured through individual
(nongroup) policies, while some have employment-based coverage.
High-income persons who choose coverage through high deductible
health plans coupled with HSAs enjoy substantial tax benefits-indeed
the tax benefits that subsidize these policies are of value primarily to
high bracket taxpayers. 4 0 High-income persons are often better educated
as well, and thus better able to use the comparative health care
information increasingly available through these plans. 4 1 There is
evidence that participants in consumer-driven plans are making better
health care decisions-using more preventive care and cutting health
care costs. 4 2
It must be remembered, however, that these plans
disproportionately cover the wealthy and well-educated, precisely those
who should be able to use information to improve health care purchasing.
Between those at the bottom, covered by Mass Health or
Commonwealth Care, and those at the top, covered by comprehensive
insurance policies or generous HSA-linked high deductible health plans,
will be a tier of those covered through the Connector without
Commonwealth Care subsidies. The plans that cover these persons will
likely have high deductibles and coinsurance and copayment obligations,

39. See EHEALTHINSURANCE, HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS: JANUARY 2005-DECEMBER 2005
(2006), http://www.ehealthinsurance.com/contert/ReportNew/2005 HSAFullYearReport-05 -10-06F.
pdf, 9 (20% of nongroup insurance plans sold by large on-line insurance broker in 2005 were sold to
persons with incomes of $100,000 or more).
40. According to one scenario, a family who invests the maximum amount in an HSA over a
forty year period, paying for its medical expenses out of pocket rather than from the HSA, could
accumulate $1.5 million that could be withdrawn at retirement. Consumer Directed Health Care Inc.,
HSA Investment Scenario, http://www.cdhcinc.com/hsas.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2007). If the
family instead used the account to cover $1000 in medical expenses each year and the full deductible
every ten years, it would still end up with $1.25 million. HSAs are not subject to the income limits
that apply to IRAs, and are thus very attractive to high-income individuals. Even more importantly,
the income placed in an HSA, unlike the income placed in an IRA, will never be taxed if it is used
for qualified medical expenses-it is a tax free means to shelter income for retirement. Thomas A.
Fogarty, Health Savings Can Be a Tax Shelter, USA TODAY, Dec. 5, 2003, at B4.
41. Existing studies tend to show that enrollees in consumer-driven health plans have higher
incomes and are better educated than those who do not enroll. Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin et al.,
Consumer-Directed Health Care: Early Evidence About Effects on Cost and Quality, 2006 HEALTH
AFF.: WEB EXCLUSIVES, w516, w519; FRONSTIN & COLLINS, supra note 32, at 9-10.
42. Buntin, supra note 41, at w523-w524. However, evidence on these issues is mixed. See
FRONSTIN & COLLINS, supra note 32, at 18-33 (comparing health care decisions made by people in
consumer-driven health plans with those in high-deductible health plans).
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as just noted. The premiums for these policies will be "affordable," thus
the individual mandate will obligate their purchase. Failure to purchase
these "affordable" policies will result in a penalty.43 But these policies
may be affordable primarily because they have limited value. When a
person insured through one of these policies becomes ill, the care that
they will have to pay for may very well not be "affordable."
Many persons who currently have HSA-qualified high deductible
health plans receive no contribution from their employers, and many lack
excess money to invest in them. According to the most recent Kaiser
Family Foundation survey, 37% of employers offering high
deductible/HSA-eligible plans covering 30% of workers insured through
such plans, do not make contributions to their employees' HSAs.44
Facing a choice between investing in an HSA or paying their next house,
car, or college debt payment, the rational choice of many lower and
moderate income persons in high deductible plans with an HSA option
will often be to forego the small tax benefit (if any) gained from
investing in the HSA in favor of meeting more immediate needs.
Basically, many moderate income people with high deductible health
plans have essentially catastrophic policies, their HSAs are nonexistent
or largely empty. About one-fifth of HSA holders contribute nothing to
their account (including over a quarter of those earning $50,000 or less)
and over one-quarter (including 35% of those with a health problem)
have nothing left in the HSA at the end of the year.45 They will have to
meet health care costs up to the deductible limit out of current income or
borrowing, and many will face serious financial hardship if they fall
seriously ill or are seriously injured.
Even the RAND Health Information Study, the holy writ of the
consumer-driven health care movement, found that low-income
participants suffered adverse health consequences from high costsharing.46 This has been confirmed by subsequent studies of the effects
of high cost-sharing, particularly for drug purchases. 47 There is also
growing evidence that high cost-sharing often leads to financial disaster.
The RAND study shielded participants from financial hardship,
providing subsidies as well as graduated deductibles keyed to household

43. H.B. 4479, 2006 Leg., 2d Ann. Sess. § 13 (Mass. 2006) (enacted).
44. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, supra note 31, at 5.
45. FRONSTIN & COLLINS, supra note 32, at 18.
46. NEWHOUSE, supranote 15, at 208-10, 219, 339-40 (1993).
47. John Hsu et al., Unintended Consequences of Caps on Medicare Drug Benefits, 354 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2349, 2356 (2006); Robin Tamblyn et al., Adverse Events Associated with Prescription
Drug Cost-SharingAmong Poorand Elderly Persons,285 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 421, 424-27 (2001).
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income to make sure that no one suffered financially from participating
in the high cost-sharing plans.48 It did not, therefore, even examine the
financial impact of cost-sharing. There is today, however, strong
evidence that high cost-sharing has a devastating financial impact on
those who become ill, even those who have moderate incomes and are
not extremely poor.
More than one in seven American families spent 10% or more of
their income (5% or more if low income) on out-of-pocket medical costs
in 2001 and 2002, according to one study.49 Adults with health problems
who have deductibles above $500 (and particularly those with incomes
below $35,000 a year) are much more likely than those with lower
deductibles to not fill a prescription, not get needed specialist care, skip a
recommended test or follow-up visit, or report having a medical problem
for which they have not sought medical care. 50 Patients with high
deductibles are also much more likely to have medical bill or medical
debt problems. 51 "Nearly half of underinsured adults reported that they
were contacted by a collection agency" in the year prior to the survey
regarding medical bills, while "more than one-third said that they had to
change their way of life dramatically to pay for medical bills. '52 Medical
debt is one of the most important contributors to bankruptcies in the
United States. 3 Therefore, for those whose incomes are immediately
above 300% of the poverty level, high cost-sharing is likely to have a
dramatic and deleterious effect.
It is important to remember that the goal of health care reform is not
access to health insurance, it is access to health care. If a person is
technically able to afford insurance, but that insurance does not make it
possible for that person to afford health care, health care is not
accessible. High cost-sharing makes sense for those who face a trade-off
between liposuction and another new car; between an orthopedic MRI
and a weekend in the Bahamas. It may be a barrier, however, to the
person who has to choose between going to the doctor or dentist and
48.

NEWHOUSE, supra note 15, at 407-08.

49. MARK MERLIS ET AL., RISING OUT-OF-POCKET SPENDING FOR MEDICAL CARE: A
GROWING STRAIN ON FAMILY BUDGETS, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND 3 (2006), available at
http://www.cmwf.org/usr-doc/Merlis-risingoopspending_887.pdf.
50. KAREN DAVIS ET AL., HOW HIGH IS TOO HIGH? IMPLICATIONS OF HIGH-DEDUCTIBLE
HEALTH PLANS, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND 10 (2005), available at http://www.cmwf.org/

usrdoc/816_Davishow highis too highimpl_HDHPs.pdf.
51. Id.
at 11.
52. Cathy Schoen etal., Insured But Not Protected. How Many Adults are Underinsured?
2005 HEALTH AFF.: WEB EXCLUSIVES, w5-289,w5-296.
53. David Himmelstein et al., Illness and Injury as Contributorsto Bankruptcy, 2005 HEALTH
AFF.: WEB EXCLUSIVES, w5-63, w5-70.
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paying for the next meal, or even making the next payment on a rent-toown TV or used car.
Health care is not just another consumer product. The fact that
Massachusetts has singled out health coverage for universal coverage, as
opposed to computers or automobiles, or even food or housing, suggests
that political leaders in Massachusetts believe this as well. Basic health
care, like basic education, is a fundamental prerequisite to being able to
accomplish anything in life.54 One can certainly argue about which
health care is basic, but few of us are willing to allow someone to die in
the street of an eminently treatable condition.
There are two fundamental problems that must be addressed to
provide universal health care. First, there is the incredibly skewed nature
of health care costs. One percent of the population in any one year is
responsible for 27% of health care costs, 2% for 38%, 5% for 55%, and
10% for almost 70%. 55 Because of this, we need insurance to shift
resources from the healthy to the unhealthy. Second, the distribution of
wealth and income in the United States is incredibly skewed. Almost
half of the population lives on 300% of the poverty level, while 1% of
the population controls 40% of the nation's wealth.56 Therefore, we need
government to move resources from the wealthy to the unwealthy, at
least to the extent necessary to allow the unwealthy basic health care.
Markets simply cannot do this.
Every other nation uses social insurance or tax-funded health
services to accomplish this.57 Every system is different and does it
differently and to different degrees. 58 But in the end, nowhere else in the
developed world do you see the level of lack of access to health care that
exists in the United States.
It is quite interesting to compare the Massachusetts program to the
program recently adopted by the Netherlands. 59 Like Massachusetts, the
54. THOMAS RICE, THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH RECONSIDERED, 161 (1st ed. 1998); Deborah
Stone, How Market Ideology Guarantees Racial Inequality, in HEALTHY, WEALTHY, AND FAIR:
HEALTH CARE AND THE GOOD SOCIETY, 65, 68 (James A. Morone & Lawrence.R. Jacobs eds.,

2005).
55.

Marc L. Berk & Alan C. Monheit, The Concentration of Health Expenditures Revisited,

HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 9, 12.
56. G. William Domhoff, Wealth, Income and Power, tbl.2, Dec., 2006, http://sociology.ucsc.
edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html; United States Census Bureau, Annual Demographic
Survey,
March
Supplement,
tbl.POVO1,
http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032006/pov/new
01 00.htm.
57. See Jost, supra note 3, at 433.
58. See id. ("All developed nations have recognized that voluntary private insurance cannot
cover everyone ... and have developed some form of public health insurance.").
59. See generally MINISTERIE VAN VOLKSGEZONDHEID, WELZIJN EN SPORT [MINISTRY OF
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Dutch system depends on an individual mandate and private insurers to
provide coverage for most acute-care services. 60 The Netherlands has
taken four measures, however, to assure that health care is reasonably
accessible to all. First, long-term care services are covered through a
separate social insurance program, thus protecting the insurers from the
most extraordinarily expensive form of care and making insurance more
affordable.6 1 Second, about half of the premiums for private health
insurance are covered through income-based social insurance
contributions-the more you earn the more you pay.62 Third, public
subsidies are available to persons with low incomes to cover the part of
the premium they would otherwise have to pay for out of pocket.63
Fourth, coverage of children is publicly financed64 . In combination,
these measures make health insurance affordable to most, including those
with lower incomes.
Cost-sharing or user fees, as they are usually called, are in fact
common throughout most of the health care systems of developed
countries. 65 They usually take the form of coinsurance or copayments,
though deductibles can also be found. Most countries, however, cap outof-pocket exposure at some point.
Germany, for example, has
copayments for drugs, ambulatory care and inpatient hospital care.66 The
HEALTH, WELFARE AND SPORT], HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE NETHERLANDS: THE NEW HEALTH
INSURANCE SYSTEM FROM 2006 (2005), available at http://www.europeanvoice.com/downloads/
NL NewHealthInsuranceSystem.pdf (summarizing the Dutch health care insurance system as of
January
1,
2006);
STEFAN
GREII,
MARAL
MANOUGUIAN
&
JORGEN
WASEM,
KRANKENVERSICHERUNGSREFORM IN DEN NIEDERLANDEN: VORBILD FOR EINEN KOMPROMISS
ZWISCHEN BORGERVERSICHERUNG UND PAUSCHALPRAMIE IN DEUTSCHLAND? [HEALTH INSURANCE
REFORM IN THE NETHERLANDS: EXAMPLE FOR A COMPROMISE BETWEEN TAX -FINANCED AND
PREMIUM-FINANCED INSURANCE IN GERMANY?] (2006), available at http://www.boeckler.de/
pdffof/S-2006-812-4-1 .pdf (discussing the Dutch health care insurance system reform of 2006 as a
possible mode for achieving reform of the German health care system).
60. MINISTERIE, supra note 59, at 4 ("Together, the entitlements existing under the Exceptional
Medical Expenses Act and Health Insurance Act [requiring everyone in the Netherlands to take out
insurance to cover the costs of care] offer all members of the public adequate cover against medical
expenses.").
61. Id. at § 3.1, p. 28 (describing the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act, which "provide[s] for
the considerable financial consequences of serious long-term sicknesses or disorders, in particular
the cost of caring for disabled people with severe congenital physical or mental disorders and
psychiatric patients requiring long-term nursing and care").
62. Id. at § 1.9, p. 16 ("[1]ncome-related contribution[s] . . . cover 50% of the total macro
premium burden.").
63. Id. at § 2.3, p. 24 ("Everybody with health insurance is entitled to a health care allowance
...if their premiums ...are disproportionately high compared with their income.").
64. Id. at § 1.9, p. 17.
65. Ray Robinson, User Charges for Health Care, in FUNDING HEALTH CARE: OPTIONS FOR
EUROPE 161, 161 (Elias Mosiallos etal., eds., 2002).
66. REINHARD BUSSE & ANNETTE RIESBERG, HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS IN TRANSITION:
GERMANY, 75 (2004).
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copayment obligation ceases, however, once a person has paid 2% of
67
annual income for copayments, 1% if the person has a chronic illness.
Thus, about
10% to 30% of the population has no cost-sharing
68
obligation.

People who are not abjectly poor should have to pay something for
health care and for health insurance. Health care is of great value, and
should not be free for those who can afford it. Moreover, moral hazard is
a real problem, although perhaps not as all-important as consumer-driven
advocates think. Cost-sharing is a rational approach to addressing it.
But no one should have to choose between health care and financial
impoverishment. The Massachusetts plan does well in trying to make
sure that insurance is affordable, but it may need to pay more attention to
the extent to which it exposes moderate income persons with high health
care costs to financial ruin. Self-insurance may be fine for the wealthy,
but it can be a recipe for disaster for persons with low or moderate
income. It is to be hoped that policy makers in Massachusetts will
monitor implementation of their new health care plan carefully to make
sure that this is not allowed to happen. Those who implement the plan
should assure that deductibles, coinsurance obligations, copayments, and
total out-of-pocket limits are reasonable and related to income. Only in
this way can Massachusetts assure that health care is accessible and
affordable to all, not just to the very poor and the very wealthy.

67. Id.
68. Id.

